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Abstract. To protect user privacy in data analysis, a state-of-the-art
strategy is differential privacy in which scientific noise is injected into the
real analysis output. The noise masks individual’s sensitive information
contained in the dataset. However, determining the amount of noise is
a key challenge, since too much noise will destroy data utility while too
little noise will increase privacy risk. Though previous research works
have designed some mechanisms to protect data privacy in different sce-
narios, most of the existing studies assume uniform privacy concerns for
all individuals. Consequently, putting an equal amount of noise to all
individuals leads to insufficient privacy protection for some users, while
over-protecting others. To address this issue, we propose a self-adaptive
approach for privacy concern detection based on user personality. Our
experimental studies demonstrate the effectiveness to address a suitable
personalized privacy protection for cold-start users (i.e., without their
privacy-concern information in training data).
1 Introduction
Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have opened many new possibil-
ities (e.g., data analytics, autonomous systems), however, they pose the risk
regarding privacy and security [1]. Together with the advances in AI and the
increasing volume of user-generated content (UGC) such as social network data
and medical data, privacy concern on personal data becomes even more critical
[2]. Especially, the cross-disciplinary studies have been conducted with the need
of integrating personal data from multiple sources (e.g., studies by combining
diet data, work condition data, and health data). This data integration dramat-
ically increases the risk of privacy leakage. For example, Narayanan et al. [3]
de-anonymized the published Netflix Prize data by matching with IMDB data1.
Moreover, not only connecting to external sources will reveal privacy but also
internal model parameters. Fredrikson et al. [4] used hill-climbing algorithm on
the output probabilities of a computer-vision classifier to reveal individual faces
from the training data. As witnessed by these demonstrations and because pri-
vacy guarantees must apply to the worst-case outliers (not only the average), any
strategy for protecting data privacy should prudently assume that attackers have
unfettered access to external data sources as well as internal model parameters.
1 http://www.imdb.com/
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UGC data has been used in many research areas ranging from psychology
(e.g., predicting personality [5,6]) to data analytics (e.g., predicting stock market
[7]). The privacy issues become more and more critical, especially when sensi-
tive information (e.g., age, gender) can be derived from UGC data [8]. Thus,
the main goal of this paper is to present a self-adaptive approach for privacy
concern detection, which automatically detects the privacy need of individuals
based on personality information extracted from their UGC data. In this way,
we provide trade-off of sufficient privacy protection and data utility. The main
contributions of this paper include:
– Introducing a neural network model that can learn and automatically predict
the privacy-concern degree of individuals based on their personalities.
– Evaluating the effectiveness of personality based privacy-guarantee through
extensive experimental studies on a real UGC dataset.
– Solving an imbalanced data distribution issue in privacy-concern detection
raised by Vu et al. [9] using an over-sampling approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present
related work, and introduce Differential Privacy [10] and the Five Factor Model
[11]. Our proposed methodology is presented in Section 3. The experimental
methodology is explained in Section 4. Experimental result analysis and discus-
sion are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and presents future work.
2 Related Work
Anonymization [12] and sanitization [13] have been widely used in privacy protec-
tion. Differential privacy [10] later emerged as the key privacy-guarantee mech-
anism by providing rigorous, statistical guarantees against any inference from
an adversary. Based on differential privacy, some privacy-oriented frameworks
arose including PINQ [14] and GUPT [15]. Moreover, they use a unified amount
of noise for privacy protection. To overcome the disadvantage of injecting uni-
form noise in differential privacy, recent works [16,17] have proposed personalized
differential privacy methods, in which they apply different amounts of noise on
different users. However, the limitation is that they decided privacy budget by
either random sampling or query involvements regardless of the provenance in-
dividual’s actual privacy concern. Particularly, Jorgensen et al. [17] use random
sampling for personalized DF and Hamid et al. [16] consider what records the
given query involves to decreases the corresponding privacy budgets. Thus, we
propose a personality-based differential privacy approach in a self-adaptive way
to calculate privacy concern for reasonable privacy protection and data utility.
2.1 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Differential privacy (DP) [10] has established itself as a strong standard for
privacy preservation. It provides privacy guarantees for algorithms analyzing
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databases, which in our case is a machine learning algorithm processing a train-
ing dataset and histogram-based data analysis. The key idea behind differential
privacy is to obfuscate an individual’s properties, but not the whole group’s prop-
erties in a given database. So the probability for any individual in the database
needs to have a property that should barely differ from the base rate (i.e., the
chance to guess whether an individual is involved in one study or not). When
an attacker analyzes the database, he/she cannot reliably learn anything new
about any individual in the database, no matter how much additional informa-
tion he/she has. The following is a formal definition of (-δ) differential privacy.
We assume a database D consisting of n vectors of m-components over some set
F represented as a m× n matrix over F .
Definition 1 (Distance Between Databases). Define
dist(D,D′) := |{i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} : Di 6= D′i}| ∀D, D′ ∈ (Fm)n
as the number of entries in which the databases D and D′ differ. Differential
privacy is defined using pairs of adjacent databases in present work, which only
differ by one record (i.e., dist(D,D′) = 1).
Definition 2 (Probability Simplex). Given a discrete set B, the probability
simplex over B, denoted ∆(B) is defined to be:
∆(B) =
{
x ∈ R|B| : xi ≥ 0 for all i and
∑|B|
i=1 xi = 1
}
A randomized algorithm with domain A and (discrete) range B will be as-
sociated with a mapping from A to the probability simplex over B, denoted as
∆(B).
Definition 3 (Randomized Algorithm). A randomized algorithm M with
domain A and discrete range B is associated with a mapping M : A → ∆(B).
On input a ∈ A, the algorithmM outputsM(a) = b with probability (M(a))b
for each b ∈ B.
Definition 4 ((-δ)-differential privacy). LetM be a randomized algorithm
processing D and Range(M) its image. NowM is called (-δ)-differentially pri-
vate if ∀S ⊆ Range(M):
∀D,D′ : dist(D,D′) ≤ 1⇒ Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr [M(D′) ∈ S] + δ
Intuitively, differential privacy controls the degree to which D and D′ can
be distinguished. When δ = 0 then (-δ)-differential privacy is also called -
differential privacy. Smaller  gives more privacy and lower utility. Then, given
the result of a randomized algorithmM, an attacker cannot learn any new prop-
erty about data subjects with a significant probability.
The Global Privacy Budget PINQ [14] is an implementation of inter-
active differential privacy which ensures, at runtime, that queries adhere to a
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global privacy budget . Its central principle is that multiple queries (e.g., with
differential privacy 1 and 2 respectively) have an additive effect 1 + 2 on
the overall differential privacy. In other words, for a dataset queried q times,
with each query having privacy parameter i, the total privacy budget of the
dataset is given by total=
∑q
i=1 i. PINQ also tracks sensitivity of functions to
track how much to deduct from the global privacy budget on each invocation of
a primitive query. As mentioned in [16], the global privacy budget has limita-
tions when applied to an interactive system: (1) data analysts using the system,
may run out of privacy budget even before obtaining valuable results and (2) a
global budget is not capable of handling a live database when new records are
frequently added.
2.2 The Five Factor Model
Regarding personality prediction, the most influential Five Factor Model (FFM )
has become a standard model in psychology over the last 50 years [11]. Here we
re-introduce a summary of Vu et al. [9] regarding FFM. The five factors are de-
fined as neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness, agreeableness,
and extraversion. Pennebaker et al., [5] identify many linguistic features associ-
ated with each of personality traits in FFM. (1) Extroversion (sEXT) tends to
seek stimulation in the external world, the company of others, and to express
positive emotions. (2) Neurotics (sNEU) people use more 1st person singular pro-
nouns, more negative emotion words than positive emotion words. (3) Agreeable
(sAGR) people express more positive and fewer negative emotions. Moreover,
they use relatively fewer articles. (4) Conscientious (sCON) people avoid nega-
tions, negative emotion words and words reflecting discrepancies (e.g., should
and would). (5) Openness to experience (sOPN) people prefer longer words and
tentative expressions (e.g., perhaps and maybe), and reduce the usage of 1st
person singular pronouns and present tense forms.
3 Methodology
As mentioned above, one limitation of differential privacy is the unified privacy
budget on all individuals in the same dataset. To address this limitation, we pro-
pose a personality-based differential privacy algorithm. The proposed approach
is motivated by the findings on the statistically verified correlation between per-
sonality and privacy concerns of individuals on Facebook [18]. In their work, they
output the correlation values as p-value = {.003, .007, .010} for {cNEU, cEXT,
cAGR} personality traits accordingly. Sumner et al., however, did not men-
tion about the p-value of the correlation between privacy-concern and {cCON,
cOPN} personal traits. Moreover, this personality-based privacy can be charac-
terized as personalized-differential privacy that also satisfies -differential privacy
by the proof of Ebadi et al. [16]. However, Ebadi et al. did not have an automatic
way of detecting personalized privacy-concern level, which we are addressing.
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Problem Definition
Given a database D consists of N user records U = {T, P}, where T is a set of
textual features and P is a set of five personality trait scores in the Five Factor
Model (FFM) [19]. Our target is predicting a real value r that represents the
user privacy-concern degree. The r value, later on, will be used to decide the
amount of noise and privacy-budget of the user to protect her/his data privacy
more reasonably.
A Baseline Linear Regression Model
As a baseline linear regression model, we learn a linear function y = w ∗ x¯ + b
where x¯ is an input vector and b is a bias value. Given a real outcome yˆ, we can
calculate a loss function L = 12
∑N
i=1(yi− yˆi)2, where N is the number of samples
and use it for the optimization process to find the best values of the weight-
ing matrix w, i.e., w∗ = argmin
w
L(w). Since we have five personality scores,
therefore, five linear regression models are learned to predict scores of the five
personality traits (i.e., neuroticism, openness to experience, conscientiousness,
agreeableness, and extraversion). Lastly, we directly adopt a scaled weighting
vector V = (5.0, 4.7, 4.3, 4.1, 1.0) from [18] to calculate r = sigmoid(z), where
z =
∑5
i=1 vi ∗ yj , V = (vi | i = 1, 2 . . . , 5) and Y = (yj | j = 1, 2 . . . , 5) is the
output vector when predicting the five personality traits.
A Deep Neural Network Regression Model
We hypothesize that the five personality traits are highly correlated, therefore, a
jointly learning regression model will lead to a better prediction model compared
to the five standalone linear regression models. Thus, differently from the base-
line, we design a method, a multilayer perceptron neural network model (MLP)
[20] to learn and predict r value directly (see Figure 1).
Formally, a one-hidden-layer MLP is a function f : RK → RL, where K
is the size of input vector x and L is the size of the output vector f(x), such
that, in matrix notation: f(x) = G(b(2) + W (2)(s(b(1) + W (1)x))), with bias
vectors b(1), b(2); weight matrices W (1),W (2) and activation functions G and s.
The vector h(x) = Φ(x) = s(b(1) +W (1)x) constitutes the hidden layer. W (1) ∈
RK×Kh is the weight matrix connecting the input vector x to the hidden layer h.
Each columnW (1)·i represents the weights from the input units to the i-th hidden
unit. The output vector is then obtained as: o(x) = G(b(2) +W (2)h(x)). To train
an MLP, we learn all parameters of the model, and here we use Adam optimizer
[21] with minibatches to control the learning rate. The set of parameters to
learn is the set θ = {W (2), b(2),W (1), b(1)}. The gradients ∂`/∂θ can be obtained
through the backpropagation algorithm [22] (a special case of the chain-rule of
derivation). Lastly, in the linear layer, we apply a similar approach to the baseline
linear regression method to calculate the final prediction.
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Figure 1. Network graph of a multilayer perceptron with K input units, L output
units (L=5), and a linear layer.
Implementation details: we use Tensorflow [23] to implement our model.
Model parameters are learned to minimize the cross-entropy loss with L2 regu-
larization. Table 1 shows optimal settings for the regression task and Figure 2
shows the learning curve of the MLP model on training data following 10-fold
cross-validation schema (i.e., each fold, 10% is used for validation).
Name Value
Hidden layers 80
# epoch 90
Learning rate 10−5
l2 10−5
Table 1. The optimal hyper-
parameter settings.
Figure 2. Learning curve of the MLP.
4 Experimental Methodology
DatasetWe evaluate our methods on myPersonality data2. It contains personal-
ity scores and Facebook profile data, collected by Stillwell and Kosinski by means
2 http://myPersonality.org
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Figure 3. Correlation between different features in the dataset excluding Facebook
status updates. The features here are network size (NETSIZE), betweenness (BTW),
the number of betweenness (NBTW), density (DEN), brokerage (BRK_AGE), the
number of brokerage (NBRKAGE), and Linear_Gold is the implicit gold regression
values.
of a Facebook application that implements the FFM personality questionnaire
in a 100-item long version of [24]. The application obtained the consent from its
users to record their data and use it for the research purposes. They selected
only the users for which they had both information about personality and social
network structure. The status updates have been manually anonymized. The
final dataset contains 9,917 Facebook statuses of 250 users in raw text, gold
standard (self-assessed) personality labels, and several social network measures.
Figure 3 shows the relations between different features in the data. As we can
see a higher correlation between openness personal trait to others. Moreover, the
data distribution of sOPN and sNEU in the dataset are more imbalanced than
other personal traits.
4.1 Gold Standard Values
Ideally, we would evaluate downstream performance compared to a ground truth.
Unfortunately, a ground truth is difficult to characterize for the privacy-concern
task since people would have answered “as high as possible” if someone simply
asked them “how much privacy-guarantee do you want to have?”. Our future
work would be connecting computer science, crowdsourcing and psychology in
order to collect gold standards on user privacy concern using psychological and
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Figure 4. The distribution of numerical features using box plots. All numbers are
normalized to stay between [0, 1] in order to have a good overview of the whole features.
behavior tests. Since this type of ground truth does not exist currently, we con-
structed the gold standards in our work as follows, using all available information
about users to be an approximation of the ground truth.
Gold Regression Values The myPersonality dataset contains both per-
sonality trait labels and personality trait scores. Therefore, previous works in
personality profiling can be catergorized as classification problems [25] or re-
gression problems [26,27]. Since there is no gold privacy-concern labels/values in
the dataset, we implicitly derive the values using a linear combination between
personality trait scores and the weighting vector V adopt from [18]. We denote
P = (ri | i = {1, 2 . . . N}), where N is the number of samples and r is the real
privacy concern degree of a certain user. Then, r = 1125 ∗
∑5
i=1 vi ∗ sj , where
V = (vi | i = 1, 2 . . . , 5) = (5.0, 4.7, 4.3, 4.1, 1.0) taken from [18], and 125 is a
normalisation constant. S = (sj | j = 1, 2 . . . , 5) is user personality trait scores.
P is also denoted as Linear_Gold in both Figure 3 and 4 (i.e., the last column).
Gold Classification Labels We constructs gold labels to evaluate down-
stream classification performance followed the work of Vu et al. [9]. The labels
are high (HiPC), medium (MePC), and low privacy-concern (LoPC) level as
firstly proposed in [16]. Given the ground truth of personality labels, i.e., yes
and no labels of {NEU, OPN, CON, AGR, EXT} - the five personality traits.
Based on the findings of [18] we know that privacy concerns of different person-
ality traits are ordered as following {NEU, OPN, CON, AGR, EXT} from the
highest privacy-concern to the lowest privacy-concern correspondingly. Thus, we
derive the privacy concern levels as in Table 2. Eventually, our ground truth set
consists of 29 users in HiPC, 212 users in MePC, and 9 users in LoPC.
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Privacy concern label cNEU cOPN cCON cAGR cEXT
HiPC yes yes any no no
LoPC no no any yes yes
Table 2. Deriving self ground-truth labels for classification problem. It is note that
MePC are the rest, i.e., {¬HiPC, ¬LoPC}.
4.2 Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is a process of extracting valuable and significant information
from the raw data to represent the data. Since collecting personally sensitive data
is cautious and challenging, the myPersonality dataset is small [28], so we have
to incorporate with pre-trained embedding models (e.g., Word2Vec3) to better
represent the data. Table 3 lists all extracted features in this work inspired by
Vu et al. [29]:
Feature # Features Information
Lexical Features 7111 N-grams features, i.e., [1,2,3,4,5]-grams.
Topic Features 200 & 50 For LSI and LDA features respectively.
Semantic features 300 Word2Vec model trained on Google News.
Total 7661
Table 3. Total number of extracted features in this work
4.3 Evaluation Results
We design two different types of experiments to evaluate our methodology.
Firstly, we evaluate how well we can detect privacy-concern regarding both clas-
sification problems and regression problems. Secondly, we analyze the effect of
personality-based privacy controller to see if our self-adaptive approach can bet-
ter balance data utility and privacy preservation. Abbreviations used in this
section are listed in Table 4.
Privacy-Concern Detection Using the above ground truth data, similar
to [9], we build two different privacy-classifiers with Naive Bayes and Support
Vector Machine (SVM) algorithms for the classification task. Table 5 shows the
performance of privacy-concern detection in comparison with the work of Vu
et al. [9]. In their work, the authors showed that due to the imbalance of class
distribution, Naive Bayes (NB) does not perform well. In this work, we solve
the imbalanced data distribution using [30]. Table 6 shows the data distribution
before and after the over-sampling process. Thus, NB and SVM both perform
much better than the majority accuracy.
3 https://code.google.com/archive/p/word2vec/
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# Abbreviation Description
1 RMSE Root Mean Square Error, RMSE(y, yˆ) =
√∑n
t=1 (yˆt−yt)2
n
2 EVS Explained Variance Score, EVS(y, yˆ) = 1− V ar{y−yˆ}
V ar{y}
3 OOBudget Out of budget records saying number (ratio) of records that get
out of budget at a certain iteration.
4 MLP-OOBudget OOBudget of the multi-layer perceptrons algorithm
5 SVR-OOBudget OOBudget of the Support Vector Regression algorithm
6 LR-OOBudget OOBudget of the Linear Regression algorithm
Table 4. List of abbreviation used in this section
Table 7 shows evaluation results of the regression-based problem with three
different algorithms including: LR (Linear regression [31]), SVR (SVM regression
[31]), and MLP (our proposed multi-layer perception neural network model with
a linear layer). The data was divided to 80% for training and 20% for testing.
Clearly, LR performs well on the training process, however, it was over-fitted
the data (i.e., RMSE = 0, variance score = 1) and could not generalize well to
predict testing data. In contrast, MLP performs reasonably well on the training
data and achieves the best performance on the test data. It is worth to mention
that personality trait scores were used to derive the Linear_Gold values (i.e., P ),
therefore, they are not included in the feature extraction process. This approach
is also closer to the real scenario where we can easily collect UGC but not their
personality scores.
Paper Vu et al. [9] This work
Algorithm Majority Naive Bayes SVM Majority Naive Bayes SVM
Accuracy 0.78 0.57 0.80 0.848 0.97 0.967
Table 5. Privacy concern detection performance in comparison with majority accuracy.
The evaluation accuracy of this work is the average accuracy of 5-fold cross-validation.
Before over-sampling After over-sampling
Labels LoPC MePC HiPC LoPC MePC HiPC
# of samples 9 212 29 212 212 212
Table 6. Label distribution before and after over-sampling using SMOTE [30] to solve
the imbalanced data distribution issue.
Privacy-budget ControllerWe design a learning task using SVM with the
privacy-budget controller to see how it affects the classification performance. A
10-fold SVM classification is designed to interactively request valid user records
until it receives no records. Thus, this test is similar to a real scenario where an
analyst requests to the system and retrieves information. Figure 5 shows four
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Algorithm RMSE EVS
Training
LR 0 1
SVR 4.460 -8834
MLP 0.058 -0.472
Testing
LR 0.064 -0.602
SVR 6.277 -15252
MLP 0.052 -0.305
Table 7. Evaluation results of regression-based privacy concern detection. Note that
the higher values of EVS are, the better (with the best possible score of 1.0).
different privacy budget controls including (a) global privacy budget, (b) random
privacy budget, (c) linear regression based privacy budget, and (d) MLP privacy
based budget.
Based on the experimental results, we have the following observations:
(1) Data utility of the global privacy budget quickly drops to 0 due to all records
run out of privacy budget at the same time.
(2) Except of global privacy budget, the other three personalized-privacy bud-
gets have better trade-off of privacy and data utility since they can avoid a
situation where all records run out of privacy-budget at the same time.
(3) The random privacy-budget achieves better results in terms of data utility,
however, it does not take into account the user privacy-concern level.
(4) MLP privacy-budget certainly shows a better way of controlling privacy
and data utility. The privacy-budget gradually increases which allows data
analysts, i.e., a classification algorithm in our experiment, to receive enough
data records to maintain good classification results.
To the regression problem, Figure 6 shows evaluation results on 50 instances of
the testing data. Our proposed MLP-budget controller clearly works better than
others in terms of the following criteria:
(1) Regarding performance: we consider the Gold-RMSE (see Figure 6-(a)) is
the standard. Comparing to the Gold-RMSE, MLP-RMSE and SVR-RMSE
have the same trend. However, the mean distance of MLP-RMSE to the
Gold-RMSE is 9.487, which is smaller than that of SVR-RMSE, i.e., 11.113
(see Table 8).
(2) Regarding OOBudget: LR-OOBudget is much similar to Gold-OOBudget
comparing to SVR-OOBudget and MLP-OOBudget. However, its LR-RMSE
was the worst.
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Fig. 5. Evaluating the effect of different privacy-budget control methods to the binary
classification performance of the cEXT class. OOBudget is the ratio of out-of-budget
user records.
Algorithm & Iteration 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Distance (RMSE)
Gold 1 3 4 14 21 28 35 42 0
LR 0 1 4 7 13 26 38 45 4.183
SVR 0 0 0 0 1 39 49 49 9.487
MLP 0 0 0 0 4 26 48 48 11.113
Table 8. Distance to the gold regression in comparison to LR, SVR, and MLP. The
iteration running from 1 to 30, but we only show from the iteration 23rd where we can
observe OOBudget.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents a self-adaptive differential privacy preserving approach for
data analysis. To address the limitation of unified privacy budget in differential
privacy, we calculate privacy budget based on personality knowledge. According
to our experiments, personality-based privacy budget shows a more practical
way of controlling privacy and data utility. Moreover, our proposed approach
(i.e., MLP privacy budget) shows the best trade-off of data utility and privacy
control. Our approach is applicable to real scenario where we only have user-
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Fig. 6. Evaluating the effect of different privacy-budget control methods to the regres-
sion problem performance of the testing data. OOBudget is the ratio of out-of-budget
user records.
generated content information. As mentioned before, there is no gold standard
values (or labels) from users regarding their privacy-concern. Therefore, one of
our future work directions is applying crowdsourcing technologies in user privacy
concern detection to contribute the construction of a ground truth framework.
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